China's unilateral pledge to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels raises both the stringency issue, and given that China's pledge is in the form of carbon intensity, reliability issues concerning China's statistics on energy and GDP. Moreover, as long as China's commitments differ in form from those of other major greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures. In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper will map out a realistic roadmap for China's specific climate commitments towards 2050, with its main distinguishing features including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030 and the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With current international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the targeted date of 2020 that does not accommodate well the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters, the paper suggests a new direction to break the current impasse in international climate negotiations. 
Introduction
Concerned about a range of environmental problems and health risks from burning fossil fuels and steeply rising oil imports (Ho and Nielsen, 2007; World Bank, 2007; Zhang, 2010a,c) , China had incorporated for the first time in its five-year economic plan an input indicator as a constraint -requiring that energy use per unit of GDP be cut by 20 percent during the 11 th five-year period running from 2006 to 2010. This five-year plan also incorporated the goal of reducing SO 2 emissions and chemical oxygen demand discharge by 10 percent by 2010, relative to their 2005 levels. This is widely considered an important step towards building a "harmonious society" through "scientific development". Given that China is already the world's largest carbon emitter (IEA, 2007; MNP, 2007; EIA, 2009) , and its emissions continue to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization and urbanization, China is seen to have greater capacity, capability and responsibility for taking on climate commitments. Combined with great pressure both inside and outside international climate negotiations to be more ambitious in limiting its greenhouse gas emissions, just prior to the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December 2009, China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels to help to reach an international climate change agreement at Copenhagen or beyond.
While this is consistent with China's longstanding opposition to hard emission caps on the ground that such limits will restrict its economic growth, this marks a point of departure from its longstanding position on its own climate actions. The unilateral commitments clearly indicate China's determination to further decouple its energy use and carbon emissions from economic growth. This is a welcome step towards helping to reach an international climate change agreement.
China's unilateral commitments raise the issue of whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual. Moreover, as long as China's commitments differ in form from that of the U.S. and other major greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures whenever the U.S. Senate is shaping its climate bill, given that the inclusion of border measures is widely considered the "price" for passing any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the U.S. Senate can always use China as an excuse for its own failure to pass a long-awaited bill to cap U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. This paper will first examine these issues and concerns. On this basis, the paper will lay out a realistic roadmap for China to 2050, with its main distinguishing features including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030 and the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With current international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the targeted date of 2020 that does not accommodate well the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S. and China, the paper concludes with a suggestion that international climate change negotiations need to focus on 2030 as the targeted date to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of the world's two largest emitters in a legally binding global agreement. Zhang (2000a,b) envision that China could make a voluntary commitment to total greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around 2020.
China's Carbon Intensity Pledge for 2020: Stringency and Implications

Stringency Issues
2 However, it is not until just prior to the Copenhagen Climate Chang Summit that China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels. Wen Jiabao, China's Prime Minister, made it clear at Copenhagen that China's pledges "are unconditional and they are not dependent on the reduction targets of other nations" (Watts, 2009) .
While some question China's willing action, real discussion has since focused on whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual (e.g., Qiu, 2009; Carraro and Tavoni, 2010) . While China considers it very ambitious, some Western scholars (e.g., Levi, 2009 ) view it just business as usual based largely on the long-term historical trend of China's energy intensity.
There are several ways to evaluate how challenging this proposed carbon intensity target is. One way is to see whether the proposed carbon intensity goal for 2020 is as challenging as the energy-saving goals set in the 11 th five-year economic blueprint. This involves two issues. One is rational for using energy intensity reduction as a reference. Given the fixed CO 2 emissions coefficients of fossil fuels, which convert consumption of fossil fuels into CO 2 emissions, and given that China's energy mix is coal-dominated, cutting China's carbon intensity is in fact cutting its energy intensity, as clearly indicated in Figure 1 . So we can use measurable and reported data on energy use in the recent years to infer the stringency of China's proposed carbon intensity target for 2020. Another issue requires the establishment of why the 20 percent energy-saving goal for 2010 is considered very challenging. China had met its aforementioned pollution-cutting goals ahead of the schedule. However, as discussed in Zhang (2010a,e and 2011) , China had faced great difficulty meeting its energy-saving goal.
In July 2010, China released its energy intensity number for 2009, and its final energy intensity numbers for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, which are revised based on the second nationwide economic census. Based on these revised numbers, China's energy intensity fell by 15.61 percent from 2006 (NBS et al., 2010 . The country would meet its energy-saving goal if it could cut its energy intensity by 4.39 percent in 2010. However, China's energy use rose faster than its economic growth in the first half of 2010, with seven provinces becoming even more energy intensive during this period. This suggests that the country as a whole needs to accomplish the goal set for the whole year only within a half year, with some provinces required to fill even big remaining gaps during this period. Given the annual energy-saving rate of 5.25 percent 4 during the period 1980-2000 in which China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP while cutting its energy intensity by about three quarters (Zhang, 2003) , achieving such high energy-saving rate within a half year poses a significant challenge for the country as well as for those provinces that lagged behind schedule.
To achieve the goal, it was widely reported that several provinces issued a strict rotation of rolling blackouts for thousands of factories that required them to shut down five days for every nine they operate in the second half of 2010 (Sina Net, 2010) . Clearly, the local blackouts were not what the central government intended. While they were not consistent with the national policy and were not rational, it seemed that local governments had little choice but to take such irrational measures in such a very short period of time. Even if it had taken such unprecedented measures, China in the end failed to meet that energy-saving goal (People Net, 2011) .
Moreover, as further discussed below, these reductions in China's energy intensity have already factored in the revisions of China's official GDP data from the second nationwide economic census, part of the government's continuing efforts to improve the quality of its statistics, whose accuracy has been questioned by both the general public inside of China and many analysts both inside and outside of China. Such revisions show that China's economy grew faster and shifted more towards services than the previously estimated, thus benefiting the energy intensity indicator. Even so, it was still not easy for China to achieve its own set energy-saving goal. If there were no upward revisions of GDP data, there would be an even big gap between the target and the actual performance.
All this clearly indicates that even having picked low-hanging fruit by closing 60.06 gigawatts (GW) of small, inefficient coal-fired power plants in the past four years, ahead of the national schedule to decommission 50 GW of smaller and older units in the five years through 2010, helped China to get to where it currently stands (Zhang, 2010a,c) . However, those low-hanging fruit opportunities can only be captured once. The new carbon intensity target set for 2020 requires an additional 20-25 percent on top of the existing target. Achieving this will clearly be even more challenging and costly for China. Another way is to assess how substantially this carbon intensity target drives China's emissions below its projected baseline levels, and whether China does its part as required in order to fulfill a coordinated global commitment to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at the desirable level. The World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2009 (IEA, 2009) has incorporated many policies into the baseline projection that were not incorporated in the WEO 2007 (IEA, 2007 . This projection puts China's baseline carbon emissions at 9.6 gigatons of carbon dioxide (GtCO 2 ) in 2020. Under the ambitious 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO 2 equivalent scenario, China's CO 2 emissions are projected to be 8.4 GtCO 2 by 2020, 1.2 GtCO 2 less than that in the baseline (IEA, 2009) . Now let us put China's proposed carbon intensity target into perspective. The calculations of the paper show that cutting the carbon intensity by 40-45% over the period 2006-2020 would bring reductions of 0.46-1.2 GtCO 2 in 2020, which are equivalent to a deviation of 4.8-12.7 percent below the WEO 2009 baseline set for China in 2020.
Two key points need to be made. First, even the lower end of that range does not represent business as usual, because it represents a deviation of 4.8 percent below the 6 WEO 2009 baseline levels. Second, if China would be able to meet its own proposed 45 percent carbon intensity cut, the country would cut emissions of 1.2 GtCO 2 in 2020 from its baseline levels as is required under the ambitious 450 ppm scenario. That is equivalent to 31.6 percent of what the world would need to do in 2020 under the 450 ppm scenario, a share higher than China's share of the world's total CO 2 emissions (28 percent in 2020). Clearly, the high end of China's target, if met, aligns with the specified obligation that China needs to fulfill under the 450 ppm scenario.
The previous two points clearly show that the proposed carbon intensity target does not just represent business as usual as some Western scholars have argued.
Implications of China's Carbon Intensity Pledge
At Copenhagen, China eventually compromised to agree to open its emissions data to international consultation and analysis. The EU has identified building a robust and transparent emissions and performance accounting framework as a key element of implementing the Copenhagen Accord (European Commission, 2010) . How all this will be worked out remains to be seen. China has not agreed to opening its GDP figures to international consultation and analysis. But as long as China's commitments are in the form of carbon intensity, establishing a robust and transparent emissions and performance accounting framework is helpful, but not enough to remove international concern about the reliability of China's commitments. As discussed in Zhang (2010e and 2011) , the revisions of China's GDP figures and energy consumption in recent years show that GDP figures are even more crucial to the impacts on the energy or carbon intensity than are energy consumption and emissions data. As shown in Table 1 , such revisions lead to a differential between preliminary and final values as large as 123 percent for the energy intensity in 2006. The aforementioned revisions of China's GDP figures reflect part of the government's continuing efforts to improve the accuracy and reliability of China's statistics on economic activity. While they are certainly not being calculated to make the energy intensity indicator look good to the government's advantage, such revisions have huge implications for meeting China's energy-saving goal in 2010 and its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020.
Moreover, as long as China's commitments differ in form from that of the U.S. and other major greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures whenever the U.S. Senate is shaping its climate bill, given that the inclusion of border measures is widely considered the "price" for passing any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions (Zhang, 2009 and 2010b) . The U.S. Senate can always use China as an excuse for its own failure to pass a long-awaited bill to cap U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. China is also expected to face increasing pressure from the European Union, who will find it increasingly hard to convince its citizens in general and companies in particular why the EU has taken the lead but do not see China following, because overall competitiveness concerns mean that no country is likely to step out too far in front. Notes: a The dates when the corresponding data were released are in parentheses. b Based on China's revised 2008 GDP from the second nationwide economic census, released in December 2009, which raised the growth rate of GDP to 9.6 percent from the previously reported 9 percent for that year and the share of services in GDP. 
A Roadmap for China to 2050
Indeed, in what format and under what timeframe China would take on climate commitments is of significant relevance to China because it is facing great pressure both inside and outside international climate negotiations to exhibit greater ambition and is being confronted with the threats of trade measures. It is of significant global relevance as well because when China's emissions peak is crucial to determine when global emissions would peak and because what China is going to do in what format has significant implications for the level and ambition of commitments from other countries.
There is no question that China eventually needs to take on binding greenhouse gas emissions caps. The key challenges are to decide when that would take place and to determine the credible interim targets that would be needed during the transition period. These results will no doubt be a combination of China's own assessment of its responsibility, economic and political benefits, and climate change impacts, taking also into consideration the mounting diplomatic and international pressure and the give and take of international negotiations.
In the run up to and at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December 2009, China took the initiative to ally with India and other major developing countries, 8 took full advantage of being the world's largest carbon emitter, and attempted to secure a deal to its advantage. It is widely reported that China walked away "happy". But that did not come without a high price tag. Whether to admit or not, China angered allies, abandoned principles that it stuck by during the two weeks of talks, and no doubt stoked anti-China sentiment in Western nations. The early appearance of this sentiment does not do China any good because it still has to evolve from a large country to a country that is truly strong in e.g., science, technology, innovation, economy, etc. Officially China was backed by allies like India and Brazil, but they admitted in private that this was mainly China's battle (Graham-Harrison, 2009) .
No doubt, Copenhagen was disappointing to many, particularly given that U.S. President Obama pledge's "yes, we can" had raised high expectations for that meeting. However, the situation could be worse because the negotiations could have completely collapsed. While falling far short of the legally binding global agreement, the Copenhagen Accord reflects a political consensus on the main elements of the future framework among the major emitters and representatives of the main negotiating groups.
For the first time, China was blamed for dragging its feet on international climate negotiations, previously the accusations always targeted at the U.S.. French President Nicolas Sarkozy publicly criticized China, saying that China was impeding progress in climate talks (Watts, 2009 ). British Energy and Climate Change Secretary Ed Miliband (2009) wrote in The Guardian that "We did not get an agreement on 50 per cent reductions in global emissions by 2050 or on 80 per cent reductions by developed countries. Both were vetoed by China, despite the support of a coalition of developed and the vast majority of developing countries". A furious Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, demanded that "Why can't we even mention our own targets?". Kevin Rudd, Australian Prime Minister, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil's representative also pointed out how illogical China's position was (Lynas, 2009) . Being asked in the early hours of 19 December 2009 why a pledge that applied only to rich nations and to which all those nations seemed to agree could have vanished from the final document, the spokesperson for the Swedish government that was serving the EU Presidency at that time gave the flat reply after the seconds of what-can-I-say silence: "China didn't like numbers." (The Economist, 2010) .
It is not so hard to understand why China rejected the aforementioned two numbers. The needing to cut both global greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent and that of industrialized countries by 80 percent by 2050 means that emissions in developing countries are only allowed to increase by 15 percent by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels. Given their very low levels in 1990, China considers this unacceptable. There could be a misinterpretation here. Some may interpret that a 15 percent increase by 2050 would mean that the developing country's emissions are allowed to only increase by 15 percent in any specific year from now on to 2050. This is not correct. Emissions in developing countries can be much higher than the level allowed by a 15 percent increase prior to 2050 and then come down to that proposed allowable level by 2050. Indeed, under the 450 parts per million of CO 2 equivalent scenario, CO 2 emissions in China are projected to go from 2.2 GtCO 2 in 1990 and 6. 117 percent and 46 percent for India, respectively. More importantly, rejecting a longstanding, widely reported proposal without putting forward alternatives cast China in a very bad light. It led to the impression that rich countries should not even announce their unilateral cut, which was at least reported by the Western media.
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In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, I propose that at current international climate negotiations China should negotiate a requirement that greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries be cut at least by 80 percent by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels and that per capita emissions for all major countries by 2050 should be no more than the world's average at that time. Moreover, it would be in China's own best interest if, at the right time (e.g., at a time when the U.S. Senate is going to debate and ratify any global deal that would emerge from current international climate negotiations), China signals well ahead that it will take on binding absolute emission caps around the year 2030.
4 While this date is later than the time frame that the U.S. and other industrialized countries would like to see, it would probably still be too soon from China's perspective.
However, it is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing through several intermediate phases. After all, China is still a developing country, no matter how rapidly it is expected to grow in the future. Taking the commitment period of five years that the Kyoto Protocol has adopted, I envision that China needs the following three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations, before taking on absolute emissions caps.
Further credible energy conservation commitments starting 2013
China has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation and the use of clean energy. It needs to extend its level of ambition, further making credible quantified domestic commitments in these areas for the second commitment period and aiming for a 46-50 percent cut in its carbon intensity by 2020 (Zhang, 2010c,e) .
Voluntary "no lose" emission targets starting 2018
During this transition period, China could commit to adopting voluntary emission reduction targets. Emissions reductions achieved beyond these "no lose" targets would then be eligible for sale through carbon trading at the same world market price as those of developed countries whose emissions are capped, relative to the lower prices that China currently receives for carbon credits generated from clean development mechanism projects, meaning that China would suffer no net economic loss by adhering to the targets.
Binding carbon intensity targets starting 2023, leading to emissions caps around 2030
While it is expected to incorporate the carbon intensity target as a domestic commitment for the first time in its 12 th five-year plan period starting 2011, China adopting binding carbon intensity targets in 2023 as its international commitment would be a significant step towards committing to absolute emissions caps during the subsequent commitment period. At that juncture, having been granted three transition periods, China could then be expected to take on binding emissions caps, starting around 2030 and to aim for the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050.
Overall, this proposal is a balanced reflection of respecting China's rights to grow and recognizing China's growing responsibility for increasing greenhouse gas emissions as the standards of living increase over time. The commitments envisioned for China are basic principles. They leave ample flexibility for China to work out the details, as international climate change negotiations move onward. The value of this proposal lies in the format and timeframe under which China would be included in a post-2012 climate change regime, not in the numerical details. It should not be taken for granted that China can take on such increasingly stringent commitments, because that would entail significant efforts to cut China's projected emissions below its baselines. Political reality may limit the ability of the U.S. to take on significant emissions cuts by 2020 that developing countries called for, but as a tradeoff, the U.S. should significantly scale up its technology transfer and deployment, financing and capacity building to enable China to do that. This is at the least what the U.S. could and should do, and by example can encourage other developed counties to do the same. As Winston Churchill said, " [you] can always count on the Americans to do the right thing -after exhausting every other alternative." After what is viewed as eight years of lost time under U.S. President Bush, the whole world bets that U.S. will not disappoint us this time. Only history will tell us whether that will be the case.
In the meantime, commitments by China would send a signal well in advance that China is seriously committed to addressing climate change issues. They will also alleviate, if not completely remove, U.S. and other industrialized country's concerns about when China will join them, an indication that the world has long awaited from China, and help U.S. to take on long-expected emissions commitments, thus paving the way for reaching a post-2012 international climate change agreement.
A New Direction of Future International Climate Negotiations
However, current international climate negotiations have been focused on commitments on the targeted date of 2020. With the commitment period only up to 2020, there is very little room left for the U.S. and China, although for reasons very different from each other.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls for cutting global greenhouse gas emissions at least in half by 2050. To achieve that goal, the IPCC fourth assessment report recommends that global greenhouse gas emissions should peak by 2020 at the latest and then turn downward in order to avoid dangerous climate change consequences, calling for developed countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40 percent by 2020 relative to their 1990 levels (IPCC, 2007) . This recommendation was incorporated into the Bali Roadmap at the United Nations Climate Summit in 2007. This seems a logical choice. Once the long-term goal (namely the target for 2050) is set, one needs a mid-term goal to help facilitate the long-term one. From then, the negotiations on industrialized countries' commitments have been on what emissions reduction targets would be in 2020.
However, 2020 is just around the corner. More importantly, this date does not accommodate well the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S. and China. Because the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, it has not made any substantial preparations to cut emissions as other Kyoto-constrained industrialized countries have done over the past decade. Whether you like it or not, this is a political reality. It is very hard for an unprepared country like the U.S. to take on a substantial emissions cut in 2020 as developing countries have demanded, although it should on a moral ground.
In the meantime, China overtook the U.S. to become the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter in 2007, at least twenty years earlier than what was estimated by the U.S. EIA (2004) Combined with huge trade deficit with China, the U.S. has pushed for China to take on emissions caps as early as 2020. Otherwise, the goods exported from China to U.S. markets might be subject to carbon tariffs (Zhang, 2010b and 2011) . However, as argued in Zhang (2010b,f and 2011) , the year 2020 is not a realistic date for China to take on the absolute emissions cap, because its carbon emissions would be still on the climbing trajectories beyond 2030, even if some energy saving policies and measures have been factored into such projections. Meanwhile, taking on commitments for 2050 seems too far away for politicians.
If the commitment period is extended to 2030, it would really open the possibility for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the other in the same form, although the scale of reductions would differ from each other. By 2030, the U.S. will be able to commit to much deeper emission cuts that China and developing countries have demanded, while, as argued in Zhang (2010b,f and 2011) , China would have approached the threshold to take on the absolute emission cap that the U.S. and other industrialized countries have long asked for.
Being aware of his proposed provisional target in 2020 well below what is internationally expected from the U.S., President Obama announced a provisional target of a 42 percent reduction below 2005 levels in 2030 to demonstrate the U.S. continuing commitments and leadership to find a global solution to the threat of climate change. While the U.S. proposed level of emission reductions for 2030 is still not ambitious enough, President Obama inadvertently points to the right direction of international climate negotiations. Namely, international climate negotiations need to look at the targeted date of 2030. If international negotiations could lead to much deeper emission cuts for developed countries as well as the absolute emission caps for major developing countries in 2030, that would significantly reduce the legitimacy of the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs and, if implemented, their prospect for withstanding a challenge before World Trade Organization. That will also alleviate concern about when China's greenhouse gas emissions will peak and what China is going to do in what format. More importantly, it really opens the possibility to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of the world's two largest emitters in a legally binding global agreement.
